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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK VII FINANCIAL
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION,
Case No. 880606-CA
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON,

Category 14b

Defendants-Respondents.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal on the Amended Judgment on the verdict
entered June 23, 1988, after jury trial.

On October 19, 1988,

the Supreme Court poured this case over to the above-entitled
court as provided in Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4) and this
Court has entertained jurisdiction as authorized by
§78-2a-3(2)(h).
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant Bank seeks affirmance of the Amended Judgment on
verdict and amendment of paragraph 3 of that Judgment as an
obvious mistake, conceded by plaintiff's Amended brief,
ISSUES
The value of the property at the time of the conversion is
the measure of plaintiff's damages less recoupment or setoff
allowed to the parties.

Plaintiff adamantly denied throughout

the trial that Smedley was entitled to any offset for the road

-2and culvert work done pursuant to the terms of the agreement
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) but the jury found against Smedley on
that issue and deducted from the $35,000.00 stipulated value the
allotted road work value of $20,139.00 and the balance due on the
promissory note in the sum of $14,275.00.

Plaintiff alleged and

the jury found conspiracy on the part of the Bank to convert
plaintiff's interest in the well drilling rig.

By finding

conspiracy, the jury supplied the mutuality of obligation which
plaintiff alleges is lacking as to the Bank and by becoming a
co-conspirator, the Bank was entitled to all of the offsets that
Smedley was entitled to.
Against plaintiff's denials, the jury found that Smedley was
entitled to credit for the road and culvert work done pursuant to
the agreement.

Smedley's good faith claim to a substantial

interest in the drilling rig was therefore confirmed by the jury
and the Bank's reliance upon Smedley1s claimed interest was a
substantial part of conspiracy charged against the Bank, and the
conduct of the Bank as a co-conspirator was therefore also under
a claim of right as indicated by the jury and the court properly
refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant First National Bank of Layton (hereinafter "Bank")
adopts the Statement of Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief at
pages 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the following additions and exceptions:

-31.

Smedley and the Bank did not develop a plan to obtain

the equity in the drilling rig and apply it against Smedley's
loan with the Bank."

Dale Smedley suffered a heart attack and

was behind in his payments to the Bank and his sons advised
Dennis Brown, a bank officer, that General Electric Credit
Corporation had given notice of foreclosure on the drilling rig
because plaintiff had refused to pay the note and Smedley was
fearful that their equity in the drilling rig would be lost and
that they would be willing to apply their equity in the drilling
rig to their indebtedness at defendant Bank.

(emphases added)

(Brown Dep. P. 10 L. 1)
2.

Defendant Smedley represented to the Bank that the

drilling rig had a value of approximately $30,000.00 (Brown Dep.
P. 21 L. 18) and that Smedley's equity in the drill rig was equal
to or greater than its value.
3.

(R-137)

Because of the representation of defendant Smedley, the

Bank doubted that plaintiff would pay the balance due on the note
and therefore agreed to purchase the note and security interest
of GECC, but the Bank followed the advice of counsel in
foreclosing its interest in the drilling rig (Brown Dep. P. 13 L.
10; P. 14) and the notice of sale that was sent to plaintiff was
also sent to defendant Smedley (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7).
4.

The reason defendant Smedley could perform no more work

on the property to entirely pay the $65,000.00 for the drilling
rig is that plaintiff used the real property on which the work

-4was to be done as collateral on a loan and the property was
foreclosed by plaintiff's creditor preventing Smedley from doing
further work.
5.

(R-154)

Smedley had money in its account with the Bank to

support the check tendered to redeem the drilling rig.

The

reason the Bank didn't cash Smedley's check until after Doxey had
bought from Smedley is that the Bank could not get title to the
drilling rig from GECC and did not cash the redemption check
until it could deliver title.
6.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 12)

It is true that Smedley refused to deliver the drill

rig to plaintiff because plaintiff had already stated its
intention to sell the rig and would not acknowledge any equity in
the rig by reason of Smedley's work on the road and culverts.
Plaintiff did not want the well drilling rig but did want the
contract value of $65,000.00.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THOUGH DEPENDANT SMEDLEY AFFIRMATIVELY
PLED SETOFF, THE DEFENSE WAS ACTUALLY FOR
RECOUPMENT.
Courts often treat setoff and recoupment as the same but
there is an important distinction between the two concepts.

In

most instances pure setoff requires mutuality of obligation and
involves claims that are not part of the same transaction
Milgrim v. DeLucaf 487 A. 2d 522 (Conn. 1985) but recoupment is a
defense growing out of the transaction constituting the

-5plaintiff's claim for relief; and is available to reduce or
satisfy the plaintiff's claim but cannot be the basis for
affirmative relief.

Granmo v. Superior Court in and for Pima

Co., 596 P.2d 36, 38 (Ariz. App. 1979).
In the absence of a showing of prejudice, equity requires a
right of recoupment.
787 (Utah 1977).

Freston v. Gulf Oil Company-U.S., 565 P.2d

Recoupment exists in equity as well as at

common law and is equitable in nature.

It is applied in

reduction of the affirmative claim to the extent that reason and
conscience permit and is not a separate cause of action but
applies to mitigate or limit an otherwise valid recovery.
The thrust of plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Bank
initially was that the Bank wrongfully disposed of plaintiff's
property when the Bank did not accept plaintiff's tender and
"sold" the drill rig to defendant Smedley.

(R. 9-10)

Plaintiff

then amended its Complaint and alleged UCC violations in addition
to wrongful disposition and conspiracy to convert.

The Bank knew

it did not have an independent cause of action that would support
setoff or counterclaim and the Bank therefore had to rely upon
Smedley's claim because that's what the Bank relied upon in
getting involved in an attempt to salvage Smedley's equity.

The

right to reduce plaintiff's claim by recoupment exists as long as
the plaintiff's cause of action exists because it is limited by
the amount of plaintiff's claim, is defensive in nature, and
affords no relief in excess of plaintiff's claim.

20 Am. Jur. 2d

Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff §6 P. 232; §12 P. 236.

-6Equitable setoff is in the nature of recoupment, and does
not require mutuality of obligation nor must it support an
independent obligation or counterclaim.

In Atchison County

Farmer's Union Co-op Association v. Turnbull, 736 P.2d 917 (Kan.
1987) the Supreme Court of Kansas said at page 921:
Equitable setoffs of unmatured obligations may be
allowed under special circumstances, such as insolvency
of the obligor or probable difficulty in collecting the
obligation at maturity, but such setoffs are largely
within the court's discretion.
An equitable setoff will be allowed when the party
seeking it shows some equitable ground therefor, and
it is necessary to promote justice, to avoid or prevent
wrong or irremediable injustice, or to give affect to
a clear equity of the party seeking it.
The jury was fully informed as to the participation of the
Bank and the reasons therefore and by instructing the jury on
conspiracy, upon a finding of conspiracy the Bank became
subrogated to all of the rights and obligations of Smedley.

By

asserting conspiracy, plaintiff puts the Bank in the same
position as an equitable subrogee, putting the Bank in Smedley1s
shoes as to the conversion cause of action.

See International

Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Indus. Park Co., 695 P.2d
1255 (Idaho 1985).

Exercising its equitable discretion the trial

court was therefore correct in permitting the jury to setoff
credits for the road and culvert work done by Smedley and the
balance due on the note which plaintiff failed to pay and any
judgment of plaintiff against the Bank.

-7Plaintiff submitted its case to the jury under two theories:
breach of contract for which plaintiff claimed the sum of
$65,000.00 due and owing allowing no credit for work done by
defendant Smedley (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2); and secondly for
conversion, stipulating that the value of the drill rig at the
time of conversion was $35,000.00.

Conspiracy only goes to the

conversion and sale of the drilling rig and the Bank became
involved on the strength of Smedley1s representation that the
drilling rig was worth about $40,000.00 and that Smedley had in
excess of $30,000.00 equity in the drilling rig and that is the
equity that defendant Bank agreed to take in part payment of
Smedley1s debt to the Bank.

In spite of defendant Smedley1s

representations to the Bank and the allegations set forth in his
Answer, his testimony at the trial supported a setoff of only
$20,139.00 for work done on the road and a $14,275.00 payment on
the note.

Had defendant Smedley1s testimony supported road work

equal to $30,000.00 as he represented to the Bank and as set
forth in his Answer, and had the jury so found, the jury verdict
would have been in favor of the Bank and against the plaintiff
under any theory of conversion or conspiracy because the measure
of damages for conversion is
breach of contract.

different than the damages for

It begs credulity to believe that had the

jury found no breach of contract but instead rendered a verdict
of conversion and conspiracy to convert against Smedley and the
Bank then Smedley and the Bank could not deduct the road work

-8found by the jury to be worth $20,139.00, and the note balance of
$14,275.00 from the $35,000.00 verdict.

(R-484)

POINT II
THE JURY POUND THAT THE BANK CONSPIRED WITH
DEFENDANT SMEDLEY TO CONVERT ONLY THE
PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN THE DRILLING RIG.
Because the plaintiff submitted its case on two different
theories of recovery, the jury had a right to apply all setoffs
or recoupment to each theory upon which they rendered a verdict.
Defendant Smedley redeemed the collateral and then sold without
any notice to or control in the defendant Bank and the only way
plaintiff could tie the Bank to Smedley was the conspiracy theory
but conspiracy in and of itself does not constitute a cause of
action.

Tapscott v. Fowler, 437 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1983).

In

Lindbeck v. Bendziunas, 498 P.2d 1364 (N.M. App. 1972) the court
said at page 1370:
In a civil action, however, the basis for relief
is not the conspiracy but the damages caused by acts
permitted pursuant to the conspiracy.
Where two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act
done by either in furtherance of a common design and in
accordance with the general plan becomes the act of all and each
conspirator is responsible for each act.

Vaughan v. Hornaman,

403 P.2d 943 (Kan. 1965); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage, 598 P.2d 45
(Cal. 1979).

As hereinafter set forth defendant Bank does not

believe that it was guilty of any unlawful conspiracy with
defendant Smedley but the jury so found and the Bank did not

-9cross appeal.

But neither plaintiff nor the jury has a right to

pick or choose only the liabilities of conspiracy and not the
benefits that go with it.

Defendant Bank did not allege

recoupment or setoff as to the road work done by Smedley and
indeed could not without admitting to being a conspirator.

In

like manner, plaintiff could make no cause of action against the
Bank unless plaintiff alleged conspiracy but plaintiff in
alleging the conspiracy, and the jury in finding conspiracy to
exist under the instructions given by the court, must also accord
to the Bank as a co-conspirator all of the benefits to which
Smedley was entitled.

In its sound discretion the trial court so

instructed the jury and the jury made an equitable decision as to
what was fair and reasonable based on the Bank's participation
and the overall "conspiracy."
POINT III
THE JURY VERDICT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN.
As shown by the record, it was apparent to the jury that in
becoming involved in the transaction, defendant Bank had relied
on defendant Smedley1s representations of equity in the drilling
rig.

Regardless of plaintiff's representations in the pleadings

and at trial, the jury accepted defendant Smedley's position that
he in fact did have an equity in the drilling rig equal to
$34,414.00 and the parties stipulated that the value of the
drilling rig was $35,000.00 when sold by defendant Smedley.
Therefore, the only equity plaintiff had in the drilling rig as

10to the cause of action for conversion was the amount of the
judgment against the Bank.
The jury followed Instruction Number 31 to the letter and
that is very apparent in the verdict form the jury submitted to
the court.

The jury scratched out the $65,000.00 verdict in

favor of plaintiff and against Smedley and deducted from that
figure the $34,414.00 in credits due Smedley and granted judgment
for $30,586.00.

(Appendix B, R-440)

Under Under plaintiff's

theory of the case, the Bank doesn't even get credit for the
balance due from plaintiff on the promissory note and the costs
of sale.

Instruction Number 31 is specifically directed to the

conversion cause of action, and the conspiracy as pled by
plaintiff, tried to the jury, and found by the jury relates only
to conversion, not the breach of contract action.

It is further

evident that the jury did not misinterpret plaintiff's theories
of recovery because the court specifically instructed the jury as
to plaintiff's breach of contract theory in Instruction Number 16
(Appendix A herein) and plaintiff's conversion theory in
Instruction Number 17 (Appendix A) and the burden of proof on
Smedley set forth in Instruction Number 21 (Appendix A).

Once

the jury determined that there was in fact a conspiracy the Bank
was totally dependent on Smedley's proof as to the amount of
recoupment or equitable setoff.
Plaintiff took exception to the court's instructions on
damages, alleging that the Bank should be equally liable with

-11Smedley on the breach of contract theory, but the court
specifically rejected that argument and ruled that there was no
evidence in the trial that would even remotely connect the Bank
with defendant Smedley's breach of contract if any. (T-l and 2).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES,
Even though the jury did find conversion on the part of
Smedley and conspiracy on the part of the Bank, the jury also
vindicated Smedley1s rightful claim to all of the value of the
drilling rig except $586,00 amended to $836.00 by the court's
additur.

Smedley1s claim of an interest in the drilling rig was

therefore bona fide and in good faith and the Bank relied on and
is entitled to Smedley1s bona fides.

To make sure that the jury

understood the damage issues, the court added Instruction Number
36a at the specific request of counsel for plaintiff after the
initial Instructions were given by the court.

(R-421, see

Appendix A)
In Amos v. Broadbent, 514 P.2d 1284, (Utah 1973), defendant
purchased cattle from a prior owner of a ranch who had already
sold the ranch and cattle to the plaintiff.

When plaintiff's

ranch foreman discovered that the cattle were missing he called
at the defendant's ranch to take possession of the cattle but the
defendant threatened to charge him with trespassing if he didn't
leave immediately claiming that he had purchased the cattle from
the owner.

Plaintiff charged the defendant with conversion of

-12plaintiff's cattle and the court allowed the issue of punitive
damages to go to the jury.

In reversing the trial court on the

issue of punitive damages the Supreme Court said at page
1286-1287:
..•The evidence shows some high-handed conduct on
the part of the defendant in dealing with
plaintiff's foreman Dan Brown and in the
defendant's conduct in retaining the cattle and
disposing of them. However, a fair appraisal of
the record would show that defendant had purchased
the cattle from Bennion and that Bennion had
claimed ownership of the cattle and the right to
sell the same, and also that Bennion offered to
defend the defendant's title and ownership when
the sale was completed. It would thus appear that
the defendant's refusal to surrender the cattle to
the plaintiff was under a claim of right and would
not support a finding that defendant acted in a
reckless, wanton, or malicious way in disregard of
the rights of the plaintiff. A wrongful act is
not in and of itself a sufficient basis to award
punitive damages.
In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) the court
said at page 774:
The standard for punitive damages in non-false
imprisonment cases is thus clear: they may be
imposed for conduct that is willful and malicious
or that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference and disregard toward the rights of
others.
In the case at bar, the defendants believed the evidence
would show the amount due defendant Smedley from plaintiff for
work on the roads and culverts to be somewhat greater that the
$20,139.00 awarded by the jury.

There was therefore no evidence

of "a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard toward the
rights of others" and certainly no "conduct that is willful and
malicious" on the part of the defendant Bank.

-13Secondly, defendant Bank at all times was relying upon the
advice of its attorney, Thomas W. Seiler, in connection with this
transaction (Brown Dep. P. 13-18).

Punitive damages are

generally not recoverable against the defendant who acts in good
faith upon the advice of counsel.

U.S. Through Farmer's Home

Administration v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985)
CONCLUSION
The jury was diligent in following the instructions of the
court and in applying the law to the facts found by the jury to
exist.

Instruction Number 31, taken together with Instruction

Numbers 14, 16, 17, and 36a are correct statements of the law and
clearly set forth plaintiff's theories of recovery.

With regard

to the conversion claim of the plaintiff, the jury did assess the
damages exactly the same for defendant Smedley and defendant
Bank, but the court correctly ruled that defendant Bank was not
involved in any possible breach of contract by defendant Smedley.
Plaintiff's Memorandum filed with the court April 5, 1988,
clearly shows plaintiff's recognition that defendant Smedley's
affirmative defense was one in recoupment and equitable setoff
rather than setoff in the nature of a counterclaim.

(R. 291)

Defendant Bank believed it had done nothing illegal or improper
nor that it had engaged in any illegal or improper procedure and
the Bank therefore did not admit to a joint venture of conspiracy
with defendant Smedley in its pleadings and could not set forth
affirmative defenses without doing so.

In like manner, plaintiff

-14had no cause of action against the Bank without alleging and
proving conspiracy.

The Bank is therefore entitled to the

benefits as well as the liabilities of that relationship.

In its

argument on page 8 of its brief, plaintiff admits that
Instruction 31 requires a judgment against the Bank in the same
amount as the judgment against Smedley and the Instruction by its
terms applies only to the conversion theory.

The verdict forms

returned by the jury clearly show that the jury did grant
judgment against Smedley on the conversion theory in exactly the
same amount as the jury found against the Bank.

Under the

provisions of Instruction 36a, the jury granted judgment against
defendant Smedley in a substantially greater amount under the
breach of contract theory and the jury was therefore properly
instructed as to the damages that could be assessed against the
defendant Bank and the manner in which the damages were to be
calculated based on the jury's other findings.
The trial court properly refused plaintiff's request for an
instruction on punitive damages because there was no evidence
presented to the jury that would support such an instruction.
Indeed, the jury verdict shows that defendant Smedley did have a
valid interest in the well drilling rig and an instruction for
punitive damages would have clearly been erroneous.
For these reasons the judgment on verdict should be affirmed
as corrected.

-15DATED this

/rYt day of January, 1989.
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APPENDIX "A"

Selected Jury Instuctions

INSTRUCTION NO. |fj[
In the matter before you the plaintiff claims that
defendant Smedley failed to repay $65,000 which he owed the
plaintiff; that defendant Smedley converted an interest in
property belonging to the plaintiff to his own use; and that
Smedley sold an interest in property belonging to the plaintiff
to one Doxey in violation of Utah Law and this damaged plaintiff*
Plaintiff further claims that the defendant bank conspired
with defendant Smedley in said conversion and wrongful sale
to Doxey and as a result is jointly liable to plaintiff with
Smedley.
Defendant Smedley denys the claims of plaintiff and
claims that plaintiff breached their agreement to pay GECC $12,500
and to give defendant Smedley credit for work he performed on
the project and access thereto and thereby damaged defendant
Smedley and that said damage more than offsets any damage which
may have been caused to plaintiff.
Further defendant Smedley claims that plaintiff
waived any claim for conversion or wrongful sale to Doxey by
failure to reasonably protect their property interest.
Defendant bank claims that defendant Smedley redeemed
the rig as provided by law and that the bank had no further
duty to the parties and did not conspire with Smedley in any
claimed conversion or wrongful sale.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1^.
You are instructed that the Court has found the written agreements entered
into between the parties to be inconsistent and ambiguous, and, therefore, has allowed
oral testimony to explain the intent of the parties and the meaning of the agreements.
You must find, as best you can, the intent or agreement of the parties from the entire
body of evidence, that is, the agreements, the testimony and the exhibits.

INSTRUCTION NO,

lfc

In order for plaintiff to recover under breach of
contract against defendant Smedley, plaintiff must prove all of
the following propositions by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.

That defendant Smedley agreed to pay to the

plaintiff the sum of $65,000,
2.

That defendant Smedley has not paid the same.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'7

In order to prove conversion, the plaintiff has
the burden to prove the following propositions by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1.

That the plaintiff was entitled to possession

of the drilling rig?
2.

That the plaintiff demanded possession of the

drilling rig from the defendant;
3.

That the defendant refused to return the rig to

the plaintiff; and,
4.

That the defendant took the rig or proceeds

from the sale of the rig to it's own use and benefit; and,
5.

That the plaintiff was damaged.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2\

In order for defendant Smedley to prove that plaintiff
breached the agreement between the parties, Smedley has to
prove all of the following propositions by a preponderance
of the evidence:
1.

That the parties entered into an agreement

whereby plaintiff agreed to pay $12,500 to EGCC? and/or,
2.

That the parties agreed that defendant would be

allowed to do work on the project or access for
which plaintiff would give him credit; and/or,
3.

That plaintiff refused to pay the sum owing

to GECC; and/or,
4.

That defendant did work on said project or access

and the reasonable value thereof;
5.

That plaintiff failed to give credit to defendant

for the work done;
6.

That the ^erendant has been damaged thereby.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2>\
In the event you find the bank has conspired with
Smedley as heretofore instructed, you should also enter judgment
against the bank for the amount of any judgment against Smedley
for conversion or wrongful sale*

INSTRUCTION NO. J£fc
You are instructed that you may find in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant Smedley and reach a verdict
consistant with these instructions.

You may also find in favor

of the plaintiff and against both defendants consistent with
these instructions so as to return two consistent verdicts in
favor of the plaintiff, however, if you find against Smedley in
both instances the amount of the joint verdict against both
Smedley and the Bank will be deducted by the Court from the
amount you award in the verdict form against Smedley alone so as
to prevent a double recovery.
Nothing contained herein requires that you do either or
both and you are instructed that you are free to return a verdict
as you see fit based upon the evidence and facts as you find them
under the law.

APPENDIX "B"

Jury Verdict

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK VII FINANCIAL,
i

Civil Action No. 40864

Plaintiff,
1

vs.

VERDICT

DALE SMEDLEY, and
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ]
Defendants.

]

WE THE JURY empaneled in the above entitled matter,
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Smedley and award damages in the following sum:

?

Signed this

k)

^W-C
fl
^C^^JS."3o&<->**•

day of April, 1988.

Foreperson

